From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 10:24:30 +0300 From: Vitaly Chikunov To: Open-source aspects of GOST Cryptography Message-ID: <20181204072430.rxzg7bfbu5gebl2r@sole.flsd.net> References: <20181204065445.gcaguhhvh7z6gajf@sole.flsd.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=koi8-r Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: User-Agent: NeoMutt/20171215-106-ac61c7 Subject: Re: [oss-gost-crypto] EC-RDSA and a key substitution attack X-BeenThere: oss-gost-crypto@lists.altlinux.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list Reply-To: Open-source aspects of GOST Cryptography List-Id: Open-source aspects of GOST Cryptography List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Dec 2018 07:24:31 -0000 Archived-At: List-Archive: On Tue, Dec 04, 2018 at 10:02:14AM +0300, Dmitry Belyavsky wrote: > А просто EC-DSA в данном контексте что? Это американский ECDSA (FIPS 186-2, ANSI X9.62, ISO/IEC 15946-2). > > On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 9:54 AM Vitaly Chikunov <[1]vt@altlinux.org> > wrote: > > Hi, > В превью к ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 сказано > [2]https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#!iso:std:76382:en > "NOTE 5 The mechanisms of EC-DSA, EC-GDSA. EC-RDSA and EC-FSDSA > may be > vulnerable to a key substitution attack[10]. The attack is > realized if > an adversary can find two distinct public keys and one signature > such > that the signature is valid for both public keys. There are > several > approaches of avoiding this attack and its possible impact on the > security of a cryptographic system. For example, the public key > corresponding to the private signing key can be added into the > message > to be signed." > Где EC-RDSA это ГОСТ Р 34.10-2001 (а значит и 34.10-2012). > На сколько эта атака актуальна для ГОСТа или это очередной наговор > на > российскую криптографию в стиле Н. Куртуа? > Добавить signing key к message не сложно, но я исхожу из того, что > этого > делать не надо, так как в ГОСТе такого нет. Но если бы был > рекомендованный метод формирования подписи с учетом этой атаки, то > другое дело. > _______________________________________________ > oss-gost-crypto mailing list > [3]oss-gost-crypto@lists.altlinux.org > [4]https://lists.altlinux.org/mailman/listinfo/oss-gost-crypto > > -- > > SY, Dmitry Belyavsky > > References > > 1. mailto:vt@altlinux.org > 2. https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#!iso:std:76382:en > 3. mailto:oss-gost-crypto@lists.altlinux.org > 4. https://lists.altlinux.org/mailman/listinfo/oss-gost-crypto > _______________________________________________ > oss-gost-crypto mailing list > oss-gost-crypto@lists.altlinux.org > https://lists.altlinux.org/mailman/listinfo/oss-gost-crypto