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From: Alexey Shabalin <shaba@altlinux.org>
To: devel-kernel@altlinux.org
Subject: [d-kernel] [PATCH v2 6.18/sisyphus 4/5] libceph: adapt ceph_x_challenge_blob hashing and msgr1 message signing
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:42:39 +0300
Message-ID: <20261118144240.3865115-5-shaba@altlinux.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118144240.3865115-1-shaba@altlinux.org>

From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

The existing approach where ceph_x_challenge_blob is encrypted with the
client's secret key and then the digest derived from the ciphertext is
used for the test doesn't work with CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 because the
confounder randomizes the ciphertext: the client and the server get two
different ciphertexts and therefore two different digests.

msgr1 signatures are affected the same way: a digest derived from the
ciphertext for the message's "sigblock" is what becomes a signature and
the two sides disagree on the expected value.

For CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 (and potential future encryption schemes),
switch to HMAC-SHA256 function keyed in the same way as the existing
encryption.  For CEPH_CRYPTO_AES, everything is preserved as is.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8356b4b1103b8c970648c94bab724aa30e42d869)
Signed-off-by: Alexey Shabalin <shaba@altlinux.org>
---
 net/ceph/auth_x.c       | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 net/ceph/crypto.c       | 18 +++++++++++++
 net/ceph/crypto.h       |  4 +++
 net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 14 +++++-----
 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_x.c b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
index 7eb9245f6ada..55679fdfc7a4 100644
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -557,8 +557,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
 	if (need & CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_AUTH) {
 		struct ceph_x_authenticate *auth = (void *)(head + 1);
 		void *enc_buf = xi->auth_authorizer.enc_buf;
-		struct ceph_x_challenge_blob *blob = enc_buf +
-					     ceph_x_encrypt_offset(&xi->secret);
+		struct ceph_x_challenge_blob *blob;
 		u64 *u;
 
 		p = auth + 1;
@@ -568,15 +567,29 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
 		dout(" get_auth_session_key\n");
 		head->op = cpu_to_le16(CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY);
 
-		/* encrypt and hash */
+		if (xi->secret.type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES) {
+			blob = enc_buf + ceph_x_encrypt_offset(&xi->secret);
+		} else {
+			BUILD_BUG_ON(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(*blob) >
+				     CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN);
+			blob = enc_buf + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		}
+
 		get_random_bytes(&auth->client_challenge, sizeof(u64));
 		blob->client_challenge = auth->client_challenge;
 		blob->server_challenge = cpu_to_le64(xi->server_challenge);
-		ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&xi->secret, 0 /* dummy */,
-				     enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN,
-				     sizeof(*blob));
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return ret;
+
+		if (xi->secret.type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES) {
+			ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&xi->secret, 0 /* dummy */,
+					     enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN,
+					     sizeof(*blob));
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+		} else {
+			ceph_hmac_sha256(&xi->secret, blob, sizeof(*blob),
+					 enc_buf);
+			ret = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		}
 
 		auth->struct_v = 3;  /* nautilus+ */
 		auth->key = 0;
@@ -1064,11 +1077,19 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg,
 			__le32 data_crc;
 			__le32 data_len;
 			__le32 seq_lower_word;
-		} __packed *sigblock = enc_buf;
+		} __packed *sigblock;
 		struct {
 			__le64 a, b, c, d;
 		} __packed *penc = enc_buf;
-		int ciphertext_len;
+
+		if (au->session_key.type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES) {
+			/* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */
+			sigblock = enc_buf;
+		} else {
+			BUILD_BUG_ON(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(*sigblock) >
+				     CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN);
+			sigblock = enc_buf + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		}
 
 		sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc;
 		sigblock->front_crc = msg->footer.front_crc;
@@ -1079,12 +1100,18 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg,
 		sigblock->data_len = msg->hdr.data_len;
 		sigblock->seq_lower_word = *(__le32 *)&msg->hdr.seq;
 
-		/* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */
-		ret = ceph_crypt(&au->session_key, 0 /* dummy */,
-				 true, enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN,
-				 sizeof(*sigblock), &ciphertext_len);
-		if (ret)
-			return ret;
+		if (au->session_key.type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES) {
+			int ciphertext_len; /* unused */
+
+			ret = ceph_crypt(&au->session_key, 0 /* dummy */,
+					 true, enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN,
+					 sizeof(*sigblock), &ciphertext_len);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+		} else {
+			ceph_hmac_sha256(&au->session_key, sigblock,
+					 sizeof(*sigblock), enc_buf);
+		}
 
 		*psig = penc->a ^ penc->b ^ penc->c ^ penc->d;
 	}
diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c
index b54085d8d5f0..b2067ea6c38a 100644
--- a/net/ceph/crypto.c
+++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_prepare(struct ceph_crypto_key *key,
 	case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES:
 		return set_aes_tfm(key);
 	case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5:
+		hmac_sha256_preparekey(&key->hmac_key, key->key, key->len);
 		return set_krb5_tfms(key, key_usages, key_usage_cnt);
 	default:
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
@@ -178,6 +179,7 @@ void ceph_crypto_key_destroy(struct ceph_crypto_key *key)
 			key->aes_tfm = NULL;
 		}
 	} else if (key->type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5) {
+		memzero_explicit(&key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key));
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key->krb5_tfms); i++) {
 			if (key->krb5_tfms[i]) {
 				crypto_free_aead(key->krb5_tfms[i]);
@@ -436,6 +438,22 @@ int ceph_crypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int data_len)
 	}
 }
 
+void ceph_hmac_sha256(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const void *buf,
+		      int buf_len, u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
+{
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE:
+	case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES:
+		memset(hmac, 0, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		return;
+	case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5:
+		hmac_sha256(&key->hmac_key, buf, buf_len, hmac);
+		return;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
 static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;
diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.h b/net/ceph/crypto.h
index 2c37c54d0f56..3a2ade15abbc 100644
--- a/net/ceph/crypto.h
+++ b/net/ceph/crypto.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _FS_CEPH_CRYPTO_H
 #define _FS_CEPH_CRYPTO_H
 
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
 #include <linux/ceph/types.h>
 #include <linux/ceph/buffer.h>
 
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ struct ceph_crypto_key {
 	union {
 		struct crypto_sync_skcipher *aes_tfm;
 		struct {
+			struct hmac_sha256_key hmac_key;
 			const struct krb5_enctype *krb5_type;
 			struct crypto_aead *krb5_tfms[3];
 		};
@@ -39,6 +41,8 @@ int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int usage_slot, bool encrypt,
 	       void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len);
 int ceph_crypt_data_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key);
 int ceph_crypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int data_len);
+void ceph_hmac_sha256(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const void *buf,
+		      int buf_len, u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
 int ceph_crypto_init(void);
 void ceph_crypto_shutdown(void);
 
diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
index 4bb238eb8606..d5300c66258d 100644
--- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
@@ -778,9 +778,9 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
 	return 0;  /* auth_x, secure mode */
 }
 
-static void ceph_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
-			     const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt,
-			     u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
+static void con_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
+			    const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt,
+			    u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
 {
 	struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx;
 	int i;
@@ -1437,8 +1437,8 @@ static int prepare_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con)
 	if (!buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs, con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt,
-			 CTRL_BODY(buf));
+	con_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs, con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt,
+			CTRL_BODY(buf));
 
 	return prepare_control(con, FRAME_TAG_AUTH_SIGNATURE, buf,
 			       SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
@@ -2441,8 +2441,8 @@ static int process_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs, con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt,
-			 hmac);
+	con_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs, con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt,
+			hmac);
 
 	ceph_decode_need(&p, end, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, bad);
 	if (crypto_memneq(p, hmac, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
-- 
2.50.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18 14:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 14:42 [d-kernel] [PATCH v2 6.18/sisyphus 0/5] libceph: add support for AES256KRB5 (aes256k) cephx keys Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 14:42 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH v2 6.18/sisyphus 1/5] libceph: generalize ceph_x_encrypt_offset() and ceph_x_encrypt_buflen() Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 14:42 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH v2 6.18/sisyphus 2/5] libceph: introduce ceph_crypto_key_prepare() Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 14:42 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH v2 6.18/sisyphus 3/5] libceph: add support for CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 14:42 ` Alexey Shabalin [this message]
2026-11-18 14:42 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH v2 6.18/sisyphus 5/5] config: enable CONFIG_CRYPTO_KRB5 Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-20 12:59 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH v2 6.18/sisyphus 0/5] libceph: add support for AES256KRB5 (aes256k) cephx keys Ivan A. Melnikov

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