From: Alexey Shabalin <shaba@altlinux.org>
To: devel-kernel@altlinux.org
Cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Subject: [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 28/29] libceph: adapt ceph_x_challenge_blob hashing and msgr1 message signing
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:45:17 +0300
Message-ID: <20261118114518.3605222-29-shaba@altlinux.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118114518.3605222-1-shaba@altlinux.org>
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The existing approach where ceph_x_challenge_blob is encrypted with the
client's secret key and then the digest derived from the ciphertext is
used for the test doesn't work with CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 because the
confounder randomizes the ciphertext: the client and the server get two
different ciphertexts and therefore two different digests.
msgr1 signatures are affected the same way: a digest derived from the
ciphertext for the message's "sigblock" is what becomes a signature and
the two sides disagree on the expected value.
For CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 (and potential future encryption schemes),
switch to HMAC-SHA256 function keyed in the same way as the existing
encryption. For CEPH_CRYPTO_AES, everything is preserved as is.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8356b4b1103b8c970648c94bab724aa30e42d869)
[ adapted for this tree: the HMAC-SHA256 library (hmac_sha256_key,
hmac_sha256_preparekey) is not available in 6.12, so ceph_hmac_sha256()
is crypto_shash-based and returns an error; ceph_crypto_key carries
hmac_tfm instead of hmac_key ]
---
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
net/ceph/crypto.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
net/ceph/crypto.h | 4 +++
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 12 ++++----
4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_x.c b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
index 95601e93a0da..a0b8fdfc6f86 100644
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
if (need & CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_AUTH) {
struct ceph_x_authenticate *auth = (void *)(head + 1);
void *enc_buf = xi->auth_authorizer.enc_buf;
- struct ceph_x_challenge_blob *blob = enc_buf +
- ceph_x_encrypt_offset(&xi->secret);
+ struct ceph_x_challenge_blob *blob;
u64 *u;
p = auth + 1;
@@ -569,15 +568,32 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
dout(" get_auth_session_key\n");
head->op = cpu_to_le16(CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY);
- /* encrypt and hash */
+ if (xi->secret.type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES) {
+ blob = enc_buf + ceph_x_encrypt_offset(&xi->secret);
+ } else {
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(*blob) >
+ CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN);
+ blob = enc_buf + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ }
+
get_random_bytes(&auth->client_challenge, sizeof(u64));
blob->client_challenge = auth->client_challenge;
blob->server_challenge = cpu_to_le64(xi->server_challenge);
- ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&xi->secret, 0 /* dummy */,
- enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN,
- sizeof(*blob));
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+
+ if (xi->secret.type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES) {
+ ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&xi->secret, 0 /* dummy */,
+ enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN,
+ sizeof(*blob));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ } else {
+ ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(&xi->secret, blob,
+ sizeof(*blob), enc_buf);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ }
auth->struct_v = 3; /* nautilus+ */
auth->key = 0;
@@ -1065,11 +1081,19 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg,
__le32 data_crc;
__le32 data_len;
__le32 seq_lower_word;
- } __packed *sigblock = enc_buf;
+ } __packed *sigblock;
struct {
__le64 a, b, c, d;
} __packed *penc = enc_buf;
- int ciphertext_len;
+
+ if (au->session_key.type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES) {
+ /* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */
+ sigblock = enc_buf;
+ } else {
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(*sigblock) >
+ CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN);
+ sigblock = enc_buf + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ }
sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc;
sigblock->front_crc = msg->footer.front_crc;
@@ -1080,12 +1104,20 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au, struct ceph_msg *msg,
sigblock->data_len = msg->hdr.data_len;
sigblock->seq_lower_word = *(__le32 *)&msg->hdr.seq;
- /* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */
- ret = ceph_crypt(&au->session_key, 0 /* dummy */,
- true, enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN,
- sizeof(*sigblock), &ciphertext_len);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ if (au->session_key.type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES) {
+ int ciphertext_len; /* unused */
+
+ ret = ceph_crypt(&au->session_key, 0 /* dummy */,
+ true, enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN,
+ sizeof(*sigblock), &ciphertext_len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ } else {
+ ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(&au->session_key, sigblock,
+ sizeof(*sigblock), enc_buf);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
*psig = penc->a ^ penc->b ^ penc->c ^ penc->d;
}
diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c
index b54085d8d5f0..cb00ca27430a 100644
--- a/net/ceph/crypto.c
+++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c
@@ -75,6 +75,29 @@ static int set_krb5_tfms(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const u32 *key_usages,
return ret;
}
+static int set_hmac_and_krb5_tfms(struct ceph_crypto_key *key,
+ const u32 *key_usages, int key_usage_cnt)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ unsigned int noio_flag;
+ int ret;
+
+ noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save();
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
+ memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key->key, key->len);
+ if (ret) {
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ key->hmac_tfm = tfm;
+ return set_krb5_tfms(key, key_usages, key_usage_cnt);
+}
+
int ceph_crypto_key_prepare(struct ceph_crypto_key *key,
const u32 *key_usages, int key_usage_cnt)
{
@@ -84,7 +107,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_prepare(struct ceph_crypto_key *key,
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES:
return set_aes_tfm(key);
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5:
- return set_krb5_tfms(key, key_usages, key_usage_cnt);
+ return set_hmac_and_krb5_tfms(key, key_usages, key_usage_cnt);
default:
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
@@ -178,6 +201,10 @@ void ceph_crypto_key_destroy(struct ceph_crypto_key *key)
key->aes_tfm = NULL;
}
} else if (key->type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5) {
+ if (key->hmac_tfm) {
+ crypto_free_shash(key->hmac_tfm);
+ key->hmac_tfm = NULL;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key->krb5_tfms); i++) {
if (key->krb5_tfms[i]) {
crypto_free_aead(key->krb5_tfms[i]);
@@ -436,6 +463,22 @@ int ceph_crypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int data_len)
}
}
+int ceph_hmac_sha256(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const void *buf,
+ int buf_len, u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
+{
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE:
+ case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES:
+ memset(hmac, 0, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5:
+ return crypto_shash_tfm_digest(key->hmac_tfm, buf, buf_len,
+ hmac);
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;
diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.h b/net/ceph/crypto.h
index 2c37c54d0f56..4f14c516ed01 100644
--- a/net/ceph/crypto.h
+++ b/net/ceph/crypto.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#ifndef _FS_CEPH_CRYPTO_H
#define _FS_CEPH_CRYPTO_H
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <linux/ceph/types.h>
#include <linux/ceph/buffer.h>
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ struct ceph_crypto_key {
union {
struct crypto_sync_skcipher *aes_tfm;
struct {
+ struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
const struct krb5_enctype *krb5_type;
struct crypto_aead *krb5_tfms[3];
};
@@ -39,6 +41,8 @@ int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int usage_slot, bool encrypt,
void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len);
int ceph_crypt_data_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key);
int ceph_crypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int data_len);
+int ceph_hmac_sha256(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const void *buf,
+ int buf_len, u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
int ceph_crypto_init(void);
void ceph_crypto_shutdown(void);
diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
index e8f0168d7028..e916a8cf48ed 100644
--- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
@@ -792,8 +792,8 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
return 0; /* auth_x, secure mode */
}
-static int ceph_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
- const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt, u8 *hmac)
+static int con_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
+ const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt, u8 *hmac)
{
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, con->v2.hmac_tfm); /* tfm arg is ignored */
int ret;
@@ -1464,8 +1464,8 @@ static int prepare_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con)
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs,
- con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt, CTRL_BODY(buf));
+ ret = con_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs,
+ con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt, CTRL_BODY(buf));
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -2469,8 +2469,8 @@ static int process_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con,
return -EINVAL;
}
- ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs,
- con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt, hmac);
+ ret = con_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs,
+ con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt, hmac);
if (ret)
return ret;
--
2.50.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 11:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 11:44 [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 0/29] libceph: add support for AES256KRB5 (aes256k) cephx keys Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 15/29] lib/scatterlist: Add SG_MITER_LOCAL and use it Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 16/29] crypto: krb5 - Use SG miter instead of doing it by hand Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 17/29] crypto/krb5: Fix change to use SG miter to use offset Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 18/29] crypto: krb5 - Fix memory leak in krb5_test_one_prf() Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 21/29] crypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 22/29] crypto: krb5 - use kfree_sensitive() for derived key buffers Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 23/29] libceph: Rename hmac_sha256() to ceph_hmac_sha256() Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 24/29] libceph: generalize ceph_x_encrypt_offset() and ceph_x_encrypt_buflen() Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 25/29] libceph: Remove unused ceph_crypto_key_encode Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 26/29] libceph: introduce ceph_crypto_key_prepare() Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 27/29] libceph: add support for CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5 Alexey Shabalin
2026-11-18 11:45 ` Alexey Shabalin [this message]
2026-11-18 11:45 ` [d-kernel] [PATCH 6.12/sisyphus 29/29] config: enable CONFIG_CRYPTO_KRB5 Alexey Shabalin
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