On Mon, 23 May 2022 13:44:04 +0000 Vladimir D. Seleznev wrote:
> altha.nosuid facility controls what binaries can raise user privilleges.
> Prior to this commit it only handled setuid binaries, but it was still
> possible to raise privilleges via setcaps. Now it handles both setuid
> and setcap binaries.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vladimir D. Seleznev <vseleznv@altlinux.org>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/AltHa.rst |  6 ++--
>  security/altha/Kconfig                  |  2 +-
>  security/altha/altha_lsm.c              | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/AltHa.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/AltHa.rst
> index be698709d3f0..beda40601c9e 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/AltHa.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/AltHa.rst
> @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ AltHa
>  ====
>  
>  AltHa is a Linux Security Module currently has three userspace hardening options:
> -    * ignore SUID on binaries (with exceptions possible);
> +    * ignore SUID and setcaps on binaries (with exceptions possible);
>      * prevent running selected script interpreters in interactive mode;
>      * disable open file unlinking in selected dirs.
>      * enable kiosk mode
> @@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ through sysctls in ``/proc/sys/kernel/altha``.
>  
>  NoSUID
>  ============
> -Modern Linux systems can be used with minimal (or even zero at least for OWL and ALT) usage of SUID programms, but in many cases in full-featured desktop or server systems there are plenty of them: uncounted and sometimes unnecessary. Privileged programms are always an attack surface, but mounting filesystems with ``nosuid`` flag doesn't provide enough granularity in SUID binaries management. This LSM module provides a single control point for all SUID binaries. When this submodule is enabled, SUID bits on all binaries except explicitly listed are system-wide ignored.
> +Modern Linux systems can be used with minimal (or even zero at least for OWL and ALT) usage of SUID programms, but in many cases in full-featured desktop or server systems there are plenty of them: uncounted and sometimes unnecessary. Privileged programms are always an attack surface, but mounting filesystems with ``nosuid`` flag doesn't provide enough granularity in SUID binaries management. This LSM module provides a single control point for all SUID and setcap binaries. When this submodule is enabled, SUID and setcap bits on all binaries except explicitly listed are system-wide ignored.
>  
>  Sysctl parameters and defaults:
>  
>  * ``kernel.altha.nosuid.enabled = 0``, set to 1 to enable
> -* ``kernel.altha.nosuid.exceptions =``, colon-separated list of enabled SUID binaries, for example: ``/bin/su:/usr/libexec/hasher-priv/hasher-priv``
> +* ``kernel.altha.nosuid.exceptions =``, colon-separated list of enabled SUID and setcap binaries, for example: ``/bin/su:/usr/libexec/hasher-priv/hasher-priv``
>  
>  RestrScript
>  ============
> diff --git a/security/altha/Kconfig b/security/altha/Kconfig
> index 4bafdef4e58e..cd1dd69cc48d 100644
> --- a/security/altha/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/altha/Kconfig
> @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ config SECURITY_ALTHA
>  	default n
>  	help
>  	  Some hardening options:
> -	    * ignore SUID on binaries (with exceptions possible);
> +	    * ignore SUID and setcap on binaries (with exceptions possible);
>  	    * prevent running selected script interprers in interactive move;
>  	    * WxorX for filesystems (with exceptions possible);
>  
> diff --git a/security/altha/altha_lsm.c b/security/altha/altha_lsm.c
> index c670ad7ed458..e597d722ab04 100644
> --- a/security/altha/altha_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/altha/altha_lsm.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>  
>  #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>  #include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/capability.h>
>  #include <linux/sysctl.h>
>  #include <linux/binfmts.h>
>  #include <linux/file.h>
> @@ -241,6 +242,7 @@ int is_olock_dir(struct inode *inode)
>  static int altha_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file * fi)
>  {
>  	struct altha_list_struct *node;
> +	char *setuidcap_str = "setuid";
>  	/* when it's not a shebang issued script interpreter */
>  	if (rstrscript_enabled && bprm->executable == bprm->interpreter) {
>  		char *path_p;
> @@ -267,11 +269,37 @@ static int altha_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file * f
>  		up_read(&interpreters_sem);
>  		kfree(path_buffer);
>  	}
> -	if (unlikely(nosuid_enabled &&
> -		     !uid_eq(bprm->cred->uid, bprm->cred->euid))) {
> +	if (nosuid_enabled) {
>  		char *path_p;
>  		char *path_buffer;
> -		uid_t cur_uid;
> +		int is_setuid = 0, is_setcap = 0;
> +		uid_t cur_uid, cur_euid;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * While nosuid is supposed to prevent switching to superuser,
> +		 * it does not check swtiching to a non-privileged user because
> +		 * it is almost never user.

Looks like a typo. Did you mean "almost never used"?

Best regards,
Andrew Savchenko